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CASES, REGULATIONS AND STATUTES
by Robert P. Achenbach, Jr.
BANKRUPTCY
    GENERAL   -ALM § 13.03.*
EXEMPTIONS
AVOIDABLE LIENS. The debtors claimed a $15,000
homestead exemption for a residence which they owned as
tenants by the entireties. After subtracting a first and second
mortgage on the house, the debtors had $14,400 in equity.
The debtors sought to avoid a judicial lien against the house
as impairing their exemption. The judicial creditor argued
that the lien could be avoided only to the extent the lien
impaired the exemption, i.e., $600. The court upheld its own
established rule that if the debtor’s remaining equity in
exempt property was less than the allowable exemption, any
avoidable lien would be completely avoided. The court
noted that its past decisions were cited with approval by the
U.S. Supreme Court in Owen v. Owen, 500 U.S. 305 (1991).
In re Cross, 164 B.R. 496 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1994).
The debtor filed for Chapter 7 and claimed an exemption
in a homestead. The debtor’s equity in the house was less
than the available exemption amount and the debtor sought
to avoid a judgment lien as impairing the debtor’s
exemption. The judgment creditor argued that, under Illinois
law, judgment liens do not attach to the homeowner’s
exemption amount; therefore, the judgment lien did not
impair the exemption. The court agreed with the creditor
and allowed the judgment lien to continue against the
homestead. In re Harrison, 164 B.R. 611 (Bankr. N.D. Ill.
1994).
The debtor had received a discharge in March 1987 and
the case was closed in June 1987. In September 1993, the
debtor requested a reopening of the case to avoid a judicial
lien on exempt property. The court noted that no time limit
was set by statute or court rules for filing avoidance actions
but held that more than six years was too long. The court
also established a court rule that avoidance actions be filed
within 60 days after the first date for meeting of the
creditors. In re Hunter, 164 B.R. 738 (Bankr. W.D. Ky.
1994).
HOMESTEAD. Within two months before filing for
bankruptcy, the debtor conveyed the homestead to the
debtor’s son for “love and affection” at a time when the
debtor was insolvent and the debtor had $27,000 of equity in
the house. The debtor did not list the house on the
bankruptcy property schedules or claim the homestead as
exempt. The trustee learned about the transfer and told the
debtor to list any interest in the house. Three days later the
son conveyed the house back to the debtor for “love and
affection.” The debtor then claimed a homestead exemption
for the house. The trustee sought denial of the exemption
because the property was recovered by the trustee and the
property had been fraudulently conveyed by the debtor. The
debtor argued that the property was not “recovered by the
trustee” because the trustee had not filed any formal motion
to recover the house. The court held that the debtor’s
homestead exemption would be denied because the
conveyance of the house to the son was a voidable
preferential transfer and was recovered by the estate through
the trustee’s actions. In re Glass, 164 B.R. 759 (Bankr. 9th
Cir. 1994).
DISCHARGE. The debtor had operated a citrus nursery
as a partnership with the creditor. After the creditor filed a
suit for an accounting, alleging fraud, theft and breach of
contract, the parties reached a settlement. The settlement
provided for a promissory note from the debtor to the
creditor, secured by the current inventory of trees. The
debtor made two payments and sold the entire nursery to a
third party who agreed to make the sale subject to the
security interest held by the creditor. However, the trees
were quarantined and eventually destroyed by the state
because of citrus canker. Although the third party received
compensation for the trees, the debtor was not paid and the
debtor could not pay the creditor. The creditor sought
nondischargeability of the debt for willful and malicious
injury because the debtor sold the collateral trees in
violation of the security agreement. The court held that the
evidence did not demonstrate any willful or malicious intent
by the debtor because the debtor did make payments when
possible and made the sale of the trees subject to the
security interest. In re Jenkins, 164 B.R. 700 (Bankr. M.D.
Fla. 1994).
    CHAPTER 12   -ALM § 13.03[8].*
ATTORNEY’S FEES. The Chapter 12 debtor had
substantially completed all plan payments and had filed a
Final Report and Account in preparation for requesting a
final discharge. Two creditors and the trustee objected to the
Final Report, arguing that all disposable income had not
been paid. The debtor’s counsel filed an interim fee
application for services rendered in litigating the disposable
income issue. The trustee and creditors objected to the fee
application, arguing that attorney’s fees should be paid by
the debtor individually and not from the estate after the
    Agricultural Law Digest                                                                                                                                                                                               83
filing of the Final Report because such services only benefit
the debtor in seeking a discharge. The Bankruptcy Court
rejected the trustee’s “bright line” test and held that the fees
would be allowed because the issue of disposable income is
part of the administration of the estate and compensable
from the estate. The District Court reversed, holding that the
fees were not allowed because the attorney’s services did
not benefit the estate. In re Gage, 164 B.R. 756 (D. S.D.
1993), rev’g and rem’g, 151 B.R. 522 (Bankr. D. S.D.
1993).
   FEDERAL TAXATION    -ALM § 13.03[7].*
ADMINISTRATIVE EXPENSES. In 1981, the debtor
received a discharge under the 1898 Bankruptcy Act. The
IRS filed an administrative claim against the bankruptcy
estate in 1984 but took no further action on the claim before
the case was closed. In 1991, the case was reopened to
distribute additional estate funds and the IRS refiled the
claim for administrative expenses. The court held that the
claim was barred as untimely filed. In re Sharpe, 164 B.R.
753 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1993), aff’g on rehearing, 160
B.R. 614 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1993).
AVOIDABLE LIENS.  The debtor filed for Chapter 13
and claimed an exemption for an interest in a retirement
plan and a homestead. No objections to the exemptions
were filed by the IRS. The IRS filed a secured claim based
upon a still valid lien. The IRS also did not object to the
debtor’s reorganization plan which provided for partial
payment of the secured claim. The debtor argued that the
lien against the exempt property was extinguished by the
IRS failure to object to the exemptions and the failure to
object to the plan. The court held that federal tax liens are
unaffected by a bankruptcy case and continue after the case
against even exempt property; therefore, the IRS’s failure to
object to the exemptions and plan had no effect on the
validity of the lien. In re Babich, 164 B.R. 581 (Bankr.
N.D. Ohio 1993).
DISCHARGE. The debtor filed for Chapter 13 and
listed a claim by the IRS as contingent and disputed. The
IRS failed to file a claim in the case until one year and nine
months after the cutoff date for filing claims. The claim
involved a 100 percent penalty under I.R.C. § 6672 assessed
post-petition for failure of the debtor’s company to pay
employment taxes due pre-petition. The debtor’s plan
provided $10 for payment of the IRS claim. The IRS did not
object to the plan. The debtor completed the plan and
received a discharge. The IRS did not object to the
discharge. After the discharge, the IRS levied against the
debtor’s bank account for payment of the Section 6672
penalty. The debtor sought an injunction and damages for
the IRS violation of the discharge. The court held that the
IRS claim was disallowed for untimeliness but that the
debtor could not recover damages or attorney’s fees because
the debtor failed to exhaust administrative remedies from
the IRS. In re Jones, 164 B.R. 543 (Bankr. N.D. Tex.
1994).
FEDERAL AGRICULTURAL
PROGRAMS
BRUCELLOSIS . The APHIS has adopted as final
regulations adding Kansas to the list of validated
brucellosis-free states. 59 Fed. Reg. 22496 (May 2, 1994).
COTTON. The CCC has adopted as final regulations
setting the 1994 acreage reduction for Extra Long Staple
Cotton as 15 percent, a target price of $1.02 per pound, and
a loan rate of 85.03 cents per pound. No paid land diversion
program will be implemented for the 1994 ELS crop. 59
Fed. Reg. 22494 (May 2, 1994).
The CCC has adopted as final regulations setting the
1994 acreage reduction for Upland Cotton as 11 percent and
a loan rate of 50 cents per pound. No paid land diversion
program will be implemented for the 1994 crop. 59 Fed.
Reg. 22496 (May 2, 1994).
FARM LOANS. The FmHA has adopted as final
regulations amending the farm tract appraisal regulations,
primarily renumbering the current regulations and
incorporating Sections I and II of the Uniform Standards of
Professional Appraisal Practice. 59 Fed. Reg. 22961 (May
4, 1994).
The FmHA has issued proposed regulations which
require field offices to suspend processing of an application
if an applicant is delinquent on a federal debt and to deny
credit to applicants who have federal judgments against
them. 59 Fed. Reg. 23018 (May 4, 1994).
GUARANTEED LOANS. The plaintiff had obtained
an FmHA guaranteed loan through a private lender. The
guarantee of the loan was conditioned upon a Conditional
Commitment which required, among other things, the
borrower to be current on all direct loans from the FmHA. A
dispute arose between the plaintiff and the FmHA as to a
Form FmHA 1962-1 required for one of the plaintiff’s direct
FmHA loans and the plaintiff became delinquent on one of
the loans. Administrative appeals resulted in the plaintiffs
prevailing on the content of the Form 1962-1. The defendant
alleged that the private lender terminated the guaranteed
loan because the plaintiff had provided inaccurate financial
information and was not current on direct loans. The
plaintiff alleged that the guarantee was withdrawn in
violation of the contract because of the dispute over the
Form 1962-1. The defendant argued that no action for
breach of contract arose because the plaintiff was not a party
to the guarantee agreement between the FmHA and the
lender. The court held that the plaintiff was a third party
beneficiary of the contract in that the guarantee was entered
into for the benefit of the plaintiff. The court presented a
lengthy discussion in rejecting a second condition of third
party beneficiary status for government contracts
established by Baudier Marine Electronics, Sales and
Service, Inc. v. U.S. 6 Cl. Ct. 246 (1984), aff’d, 765 F.2d
163 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (second condition: parties to contract
intended to enable third party to sue government for breach
of contract). The court held, however, that the withdrawal of
the guarantee was proper pursuant to the Conditional
Commitment which was made a part of the guarantee
contract by several references. Schuerman v. U.S., 30 Fed.
Cl. 420 (1994).
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MIGRANT AGRICULTURAL WORKERS-ALM §
3.04.* The plaintiffs were migrant agricultural workers
recruited by one of the defendants to work on the cabbage
fields of a farm corporation. The issue involved whether the
farm corporation was an employer subject to the Migrant
and Seasonal Agricultural Workers Protection Act as a joint
employer with the labor contractor defendant. Citing
Hodgson v. Griffin & Brand, 471 F.2d 235 (1973), the court
held that summary judgment on the issue was not proper
because issues of fact remained as to whether (1) the
employment took place on the corporation’s premises, (2)
the corporation had control over the workers, (3) the
corporation had the power to hire or fire the workers or to
change their employment conditions, (4) the workers
performed a specialty job, and (5) the workers could refuse
to work for the corporation. Campbell v. Miller, 844 F.
Supp. 1516 (M.D. Fla. 1994).
SHEEP. The APHIS has adopted as final regulations
allowing sheep and goats less than 1 year of age from
scrapie-infected or source flocks to move interstate to
slaughter, without being permanently marked with an
indelible “S”, if the animals are accompanied by a permit
and moved in a sealed means of conveyance. The
identification of the infected or source flock must have been
made after March 31, 1989. 59 Fed. Reg. 21919 (April 28,
1994).
TOBACCO. The CCC has adopted as final regulations
setting the 1994 marketing quota for burley tobacco at 542.7
million pounds and the 1994 price support level at 171.4
cents per pound. 59 Fed. Reg. 22723 (May 3, 1994).
WOOL. The CCC has issued proposed regulations to be
used for determining the payment rate and support price for
wool on unshorn lambs and for mohair. 59 Fed. Reg. 22546
(May 2, 1994).
FEDERAL ESTATE AND
GIFT TAX
CHARITABLE DEDUCTION-ALM § 5.04[4].* The
taxpayer had established a revocable trust which became
irrevocable upon the taxpayer’s death. At the taxpayer’s
death, the trust provided for a sum certain to be paid
annually to a charitable organization for 15 years with the
remainder of the trust to pass to the taxpayer’s heirs. The
trust provided that if the payments were delayed by estate
administration, the charity would receive the payments plus
interest for the delay period. The trust also provided that the
trustee could not alter or amend the trust except to ensure
that the trust continued to qualify as a charitable lead trust.
The trust could not be reduced to pay the taxpayer’s estate
taxes or administrative costs. The total annuity payments
would exceed 5 percent of the fair market value of the trust
at the taxpayer’s death.  The IRS ruled that the present value
of the guaranteed annuity qualified for the charitable
deduction from the taxpayer’s gross estate. Ltr. Rul.
9415009, Jan. 12, 1994.
GENERATION SKIPPING TRANSFER TAX-ALM
§ 5.04[6].* The taxpayer’s parents had established a trust
which passed to the taxpayer in part at the father’s death in
1972, and in total upon the mother’s death in 1979. The
taxpayer was a cotrustee with an independent trustee. The
trust provided that all net income was to be paid to the
taxpayer with the principal to be distributed to the taxpayer
at the discretion of the independent trustee. The taxpayer
had a testamentary power of appointment over the trust
corpus among the taxpayer’s spouse and children. The
taxpayer had one child and that child had one child. The
taxpayer’s will exercised the power of appointment by
transferring the trust corpus to the taxpayer’s child in trust
with the child as trustee. The new trust prohibits
distributions in discharge of the child obligation of support
for the grandchild. The child was alive at the death of the
taxpayer’s father. The IRS ruled that the exercise of the
testamentary power of appointment would not be subject to
GSTT because the appointment would not extend the trust
for more than 21 years after the death of a person in being at
the creation of the trust. In addition, the appointment did not
constitute a constructive addition to the trust which would
subject the trust to GSTT. Ltr. Rul. 9414024, Jan. 6, 1994.
Shares of stock in a family corporation were transferred
by gift to the taxpayers and the gifts were subject to gift tax
and GSTT. The IRS revalued the stock, resulting in an
increase of tax due, but could not assess the donors because
the three year statute of limitations for assessment had
expired as to the donors. The court held that the IRS could
assess the taxpayers for the taxes even though the donors
had not been assessed. O’Neal v. Comm’r, 102 T.C. No.
28 (1994).
In 1934 a trust was established for two persons, one of
whom served as trustee, subject to a four member
independent committee. The trustee reformed the trust to
provide for separate trusts, identical to the two shares of the
original trust, but with a new trustee for the new trust. The
IRS ruled that the change would not subject the trusts to
GSTT. Ltr. Rul. 9416023, Jan. 14, 1994.
GIFT TAX LIEN. The taxpayer’s mother transferred
real property to the taxpayer by gift but failed to pay all of
the gift taxes for the transfers. After the mother was
assessed for the additional taxes, the IRS filed a lien against
the taxpayer's property and sent a notice of intent to levy.
The taxpayer filed a petition for redetermination. The IRS
then served notices of levy and seizure against the
transferred property and other real estate owned by the
taxpayer. The taxpayer argued that the levy and seizure
were improper because the IRS had not made a prior
assessment. The court held that a prior assessment was not
required for the special gift tax lien of I.R.C. § 6324(a)(2).
Ripley v. Comm’r, 102 T.C. No. 26 (1994).
MARITAL DEDUCTION-ALM § 5.04[3].* The
taxpayer owned interests in two IRA’S which provided that
if the participant was deceased, the beneficiary could elect
different methods of distribution. The taxpayer contributed
the IRA’s to an irrevocable trust with the taxpayer as first
life beneficiary and the taxpayer’s spouse as second life
beneficiary. Upon the death of the taxpayer, the trust was to
be split into two trusts, with one trust, the support trust,
funded with the annual distributions from the IRAs. The
trustee was required to make annual distributions at least
equal to the greater of the net income from the IRAs or the
minimum amount of distribution required by I.R.C. §
408(a)(6). The IRS ruled that the surviving spouse’s interest
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in the support trust would be QTIP. Ltr. Rul. 9416016, Jan.
13, 1994.
TRANSFERS WITH RETAINED INTERESTS-
ALM § 5.02[4].* The taxpayer established a general
partnership by contributing cash in exchange for a 9.259
percent general partnership interest and a 90.278 limited
partnership interest. The other limited partnership interests
were held by the taxpayer’s spouse and trusts for the benefit
of the taxpayer’s family members. The partnership
agreement requires all distributions be made to all partners
at the same time, based on each partner’s share of
partnership capital. The agreement requires all items of
partnership income and deductions to be allocated in
accordance with I.R.C. § 704(b). Partners may not demand a
return of capital but may sell their partnership interests,
subject to a right of first refusal by the other partners. The
taxpayer will make annual gifts of limited partnership
interest valued at $10,000. The IRS ruled that the transfers
of the limited partnership interest would qualify as gifts of
present interests eligible for the annual exclusion of I.R.C. §
2503(b). The IRS also ruled that the taxpayer’s general and
limited partnership interests were not “applicable retained
interests” because the transferred interests constituted the
same class (as to distribution and management rights) of
interests which the taxpayer would retain; therefore, the
transfers would not be subject to the I.R.C. § 2701 valuation
rules. The IRS also ruled that the transferred limited
partnership interests would not be included in the taxpayer’s
gross estate. Ltr. Rul. 9415007, Jan. 12, 1994.
TRANSFERS WITHIN THREE YEARS OF
DEATH-ALM § 5.02[3].* The decedent had divorced from
the former spouse but no property settlement was formally
made in the court proceedings. Instead, the parties reached a
private agreement that the former spouse would receive a
life insurance policy on the decedent, a portion of the
proceeds from another life insurance policy and a portion of
the decedent’s retirement benefits from an employer. The
court held that the life insurance policy was included in the
decedent’s gross estate because it was transferred for no
consideration within three years of the decedent’s death.
The court also ruled that the portion of the proceeds of the
life insurance policy and retirement benefits paid to the
former spouse were also included in the gross estate because
the former spouse had no ownership of the policy or
retirement benefits before the decedent’s death. Est. of
Waters v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 1994-194.
VALUATION-ALM § 6.01[6].* The IRS has adopted as
final regulations under the estate and gift tax valuation rules
governing valuation of retained interests in gifts. Under the
regulations, where a decedent has had an "applicable
retained interest" in a gift valued under the special valuation
rules of I.R.C. § 2701, the decedent's estate is entitled to a
non-refundable credit against the federal estate tax, prior to
application of the unified credit, equal to the increase in the
gift tax on the transfer resulting from the special valuation.
The final regulations, instead of a credit, reduce the
decedent's adjusted taxable gifts by the lesser of (1) the
amount by which the transferor's taxable gifts were
increased by Section 2701 and (2) the increase in the
decedent's gross estate or adjusted taxable gifts attributable
to the portion of the applicable retained interest subject to
gift tax. The final regulations added a provision which
allows the adjustment if either the transferor or an
applicable  family member transfers an applicable retained
interest to or for the benefit of an individual other than the
transferor or an applicable family member. 59 Fed. Reg.
23152 (May 5, 1994), adding  Treas. Reg. § 25.2701-5.
The taxpayer owned more than 50 percent of the voting
common stock of a corporation. The corporation issued only
voting common stock and the rest of the stock was held by
the taxpayer’s family members. The corporation amended
its bylaws to authorize two classes of stock, each identical in
rights of distribution by dividend or liquidation but with one
having voting rights and the other no voting rights. The new
stock was issued in exchange for the old stock at one share
of voting and five shares of nonvoting stock for each share
of the old common stock. The taxpayer intended the change
to facilitate the transfer of the equity in the corporation to
the taxpayer’s heirs without giving up control of the
corporation. The IRS ruled that because the shareholders
would hold the same percentage of voting interests and
equity interests in the corporation before and after the
exchange, the issuance of the new class of stock and
exchange for the old common stock did not subject the stock
to the I.R.C. § 2701 valuation rules. The IRS also ruled that
gifts of the nonvoting stock to the heirs would not be subject
to the Section 2701 valuation rules. Ltr. Rul. 9414012, Dec.
28, 1993; Ltr. Rul. 9414013, Dec. 28, 1993..
The decedent’s estate included 743,500 shares of
Washington Post Co. stock which was publicly traded. The
estate valued the stock based on its market price on the day
of the decedent’s death less a blockage discount, brokerage
fees, and other registration fees. The IRS argued that the
stock should have been valued at the market price. The court
allowed the estate to reduce the market price by the
blockage discount but held that the expenses of sale could
not be used to reduce the value because those expenses were
deductible as estate administrative expenses. Gillespie v.
U.S., 94-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) ¶ 60,166 (2d Cir. 1994).
A decedent’s estate could not value the decedent’s house
using the assessed value for local property tax purposes
because the estate presented no evidence that the assessed
value was based on fair market value. The court used the
value based on three comparative sales, adjusted to reflect
differences in the properties. Est. of Dowlin v. Comm’r,
T.C. Memo. 1994-183.
FEDERAL INCOME
TAXATION
ACCOUNTING METHOD-ALM § 4.01.* Rev. Proc.
92-28, 1992-1 C.B. 745 provided procedures for automatic
revocation or election by accrual method taxpayers to
accrue real property taxes ratably under I.R.C. § 461 for first
taxable years beginning before 1993. The IRS has extended
the procedures to first taxable years beginning after
December 31, 1992. Rev. Proc. 94-32, I.R.B. 1994-18.
COURT AWARDS AND SETTLEMENTS-ALM §
4.02[14].* The taxpayer filed suit against the former
employer under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act
and obtained a judgment for $53,200 of which $26,600 was
liquidated damages for back pay. The court held that the
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liquidated damages were not excludible from income
because the Act did not provide a tort-like action for
personal injuries as to the back pay award. Shaw v. U.S.,
94-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) ¶ 50,196 (M.D. Ala. 1994).
DEPRECIATION-ALM § 4.03[4].* The taxpayer had
purchased coin-operated video games for the taxpayer’s
business in 1982 through 1986 and claimed depreciation
over three years as the taxpayer had done before 1982. The
IRS claimed that under ERTA, the video games were five
year property and disallowed the difference in depreciation
allowed. The taxpayer argued that the IRS should have
issued a three year class life for the video games. The court
held that the determination of class life was a nonreviewable
discretionary decision of the IRS. Collins Music Co., Inc.
v. U.S. 94-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) ¶ 50,179 (4th Cir.
1994).
GAINS. The taxpayer was the former spouse of the
owner of a country club. As a part of the divorce judgment,
the taxpayer received a passive one-third ownership interest
in the business. The former spouse sold the business and
refused to pay the capital gains tax on the taxpayer’s one-
third portion of the assets. The taxpayer argued and the Tax
Court held that the taxpayer did not receive an ownership
interest in the business assets but only a contingent right to
receive one-third of the proceeds if the assets were sold. The
appellate court reversed holding that the divorce decree was
a division of property and the taxpayer’s basis in the one-
third interest was its carryover basis because the transfer
was a nontaxable transfer incident to a divorce. Yonadi v.
Comm’r, 94-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) ¶ 50,183 (3d Cir.
1994).
HOBBY LOSSES-ALM § 4.05[1].* The taxpayers were
denied deductions in excess of income from a horse
breeding, training and jumping operation because the
business was not operated for profit. The court cited the
taxpayers’ lack of records, budgets and separate account for
the business as well as that most of the horses were
incapable of breeding. Budin v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo.
1994-185.
HOME OFFICE-ALM § 4.02[13].* The taxpayer S
corporation was denied a rent deduction for use of the
shareholders’ house as clinic because the house was not
used exclusively for the business. Speers v. Comm’r, T.C.
Memo. 1994-157.
LIKE-KIND EXCHANGES. The IRS has adopted as
final regulations governing the qualification of deferred
exchanges of like-kind property using an intermediary or
escrow. The regulations provide safe harbors under which
taxpayers are treated as not being in constructive receipt of
money or other property if held by a qualified escrow, trust
or intermediary. The regulations provide the requirements
for a qualified escrow, trust or intermediary and allow like-
kind exchange treatment where the qualified escrow or
intermediary is used. In addition, if the exchange is not
completed and the taxpayer receives cash in an installment
sale, the regulations allow use of the installment method of
reporting the gain if a qualified escrow or intermediary is
used. 59 Fed. Reg. 18747 (April 20, 1994), revising Treas.
Reg. § 1.1031(b)-2(b), and adding Treas. Reg. §§
1.1031(b)-2(c), (d), 1.1031(k)-1(j)(2).
LOBBYING EXPENSES. The 1993 provision
excluding a portion of nonprofit organization members’
dues as a deduction to the extent of the members’ share of
the organizations’ lobbying expenses was held
constitutional as not infringing on the members’ right of free
speech. American Society of Association Executives v.
Bentsen, 94-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) ¶ 50,193 (D. D.C.
1994).
PARTNERSHIPS-ALM § 7.03.*
ADMINISTRATIVE ADJUSTMENTS. In 1991, the
IRS mailed a Final Partnership Administrative Adjustment
notice to the taxpayers’ partnership at the address listed on
the partnership return. When no petition for readjustment
was made, the IRS assessed deficiencies against the
individual partners based on the FPAA. The court held that
the mailing of the FPAA to the address on the partnership
return was sufficient notice and that the failure of the
partners to file a readjustment petition prohibited any
judicial review of the FPAA. Crowell v. Comm’r, 102 T.C.
No. 29 (1994).
The taxpayer terminated an interest in a partnership and
received a payment from the partnership for the release of
the taxpayer’s rights under a waiver of premiums provision
in the taxpayer’s life insurance policy. The partnership’s
return characterized the payment as a guaranteed payment
but the taxpayer claimed the payment as exempt under
I.R.C. § 104(a) as a lump-sum payment. The taxpayer’s
return identified the claim as inconsistent with the
partnership return. The IRS issued a notice of deficiency to
the taxpayer without conducting a partnership-level
proceeding. The court held that the taxpayer’s and
partnership’s treatments of the payment were not
inconsistent and that the determination of the taxation of the
payment was to be made at the individual’s level; therefore,
a partnership-level proceeding was not required. Jenkins v.
Comm’r, 102 T.C. No. 21 (1994).
CONTRIBUTIONS. Two taxpayers formed a
partnership by contributing their medical business
equipment to the partnership in exchange for interests in the
partnership equal to the fair market value of the equipment.
The partnership assumed no liabilities for the equipment.
The partnership built a building on land leased from one
taxpayer using money borrowed from that taxpayer who
borrowed the money from a third party. The partnership
contracted with one taxpayer for the performance of
professional services on one floor of the building and leased
the second floor to the other taxpayer. The partnership hired
other employees for performance of non-licensed services.
The taxpayers received money from the partnership for (1)
the contracted professional services, (2) interest on the
building loan, and (3) cash flow, defined as income in
excess of expenses and necessary reserves. The cash flow
did not exceed the limitations of Treas. Reg. § 1.707-
4(b)(1). The IRS ruled that the taxpayers did not realize gain
from contribution of the equipment to the partnership. Ltr.
Rul. 9416024, Jan. 18, 1994.
LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANIES. An LLC was
formed under the Delaware Limited Liability Company Act.
The LLC Act and the LLC agreement provided that an LLC
is dissolved upon the death, retirement, resignation,
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expulsion, bankruptcy or dissolution of a member unless the
business is continued by the consent of all of the remaining
members.  The LLC Act and agreement provided that an
assignee or transferee of an interest in the LLC cannot
become a member unless all of the other members consent.
The IRS ruled that the LLC would be taxed as a partnership.
Ltr. Rul. 9416025, Jan. 18, 1994.
S CORPORATIONS-ALM § 7.02[3][c].*
TRUSTS. The taxpayer owned stock in an S corporation
which paid a pro rata stock dividend of 9 nonvoting
common shares for each share of voting common stock. The
taxpayer contributed the nonvoting shares to an irrevocable
trust which paid the taxpayer a fixed annual annuity for the
term of the trust with the remainder to the taxpayer’s issue.
The trust was also to distribute annually the amount equal to
the taxpayer’s additional income tax liability from the
annuity. If the taxpayer died before the termination of the
trust, the taxpayer had the power to appoint the trust corpus
by will. The taxpayer also had the power to reacquire the
trust corpus in exchange for property of identical value.  The
IRS ruled that the trust was a QSST and that the distribution
was a completed gift of the remainder interests. Ltr. Rul.
9415012, Jan. 13, 1994.
MORTGAGES
BORROWER’S RIGHTS. The debtors had granted a
mortgage on their farm to the plaintiff. Another creditor
obtained a judgment against the debtors and conducted an
execution sale of the farm. The creditor purchased the farm
at the sale and received fee title, subject to the plaintiff’s
mortgage, after the debtors’ period of redemption expired.
The plaintiff then foreclosed on the mortgage and purchased
the property at the sale.  The plaintiff sold the land to third
parties and filed the current action to clear title in the third
parties. The debtors argued that because the creditor took
title subject to the mortgage, the debtors remained the
immediately preceding owners and were entitled to right of
first refusal on the sales of the land to the third parties. The
court held that when the debtors’ period of redemption
expired, the creditor became the fee owner and was the
immediate past owner of the land as to the sales to the third
parties. Farm Credit Bank of St. Paul v. Michels, 513
N.W.2d 7 (Minn. Ct. App. 1994).
PROPERTY
BOUNDARY FENCE. The former owner of the
plaintiff’s land agreed with the defendant to reconstruct a
fence between their properties, with the former owner
supplying the materials and the defendant supplying the
labor. Because of the terrain, the new fence meandered over
the true boundary on to the plaintiff’s land. The defendant
leased the land as cattle pasture for several years until the
fence fell into disrepair. After the plaintiff purchased the
land, the land was surveyed and the survey showed that the
fence was too far onto the plaintiff’s property and the
plaintiff sought ejectment. The defendant argued that the
former owner had agreed to the new boundary as the new
fence and, in the alternative, argued that title had passed by
adverse possession. The trial court had believed the
defendant’s version of the fence agreement but the appellate
court reversed, finding several aspects of the testimony in
conflict with an agreement to change the boundary to the
new fence: (1) the defendant’s lease of the pasture stated the
boundary as the true line and not the new fence, (2) the
defendant testified that the former owner had contemplated
a survey of the boundary, and (3) the defendant did not
testify that there was any dispute as to the boundary. The
court also held that title did not pass by adverse possession
because the former owner had given the defendant
permission to build the new fence and raise cattle on the
defendant’s side of the fence. Brunswick v. Rundell, 869
P.2d 886 (Or. Ct. App. 1994).
RIPARIAN RIGHTS
DITCH. The plaintiffs were downstream users of water
from a lateral ditch which ran across the defendants’
property. The defendants had altered the course of the ditch
by causing the ditch to make additional turns on their
property, thus lengthening the ditch. The defendants also
filled in a lateral ditch on their property which ran onto one
of the plaintiff’s land, irrigating a hay field. The plaintiffs
demonstrated that the changes made by the defendants
decreased the flow of water which had historically flowed
through the ditch. The court held that the defendants
violated Idaho Code § 42-1207 by making changes in the
ditch on their property which impeded the flow of water to
the downstream users. The defendants were ordered to
restore both ditches to their original location and elevation.
Savage Ditch Water Users v. Pulley, 869 P.2d 554 (Idaho
1993).
UNDERGROUND WATER RIGHTS. The plaintiffs
were farm owners and tenants who used ground water in
center-pivot irrigation systems. The plaintiffs’ land was
located in a ground water “control area” established by the
Upper Republican Natural Resources District (URNRD) in
1977. In 1988, the plaintiffs were granted 75 acre-inches of
ground water per irrigated acre for five years (i.e., 15 acre-
inches per year) and were allowed to pool their allocation
among the wells on their property such that the average use
by all wells could not exceed the allocation. As of 1991, the
plaintiffs were found to have already exceeded the five year
allocation and URNRD issued a cease and desist order
prohibiting the plaintiffs from removing any ground water
during 1992. The plaintiffs argued that the cease and desist
order was improper because there was sufficient ground
water for all users. The court held that the URNRD
establishment of the control area was a determination that
the ground water was not sufficient for all users and that the
rate and amount of usage had to be limited; therefore,
because the plaintiffs did not challenged that determination
in 1977, the plaintiffs could not challenge it now. The court
also upheld the constitutionality of the enabling statutes and
rejected the plaintiffs’ argument that the cease and desist
order was an unconstitutional taking without compensation.
Bamford v. Upper Republican Nat’l Reserve Dist., 512
N.W.2d 642 (Neb. 1994).
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SECURED TRANSACTIONS
CONVERSION. The debtor granted the plaintiff bank
a security interest in crops to be grown and crops stored on
the debtor’s farm. The bank perfected the security interest
with a proper and complete financing statement filed in the
appropriate office. The bank also gave written notice of its
security interest to a farm supplier creditor of the debtor.
The debtor transferred some of the collateral crops to the
supplier’s warehouse and the supplier offset the price of the
grain against the debtor’s account with the supplier. The
bank sued for conversion. The supplier argued that the
notice of the security interest was insufficient because it did
not specifically identify the crops covered. The court held
that the notice was sufficient because the filed financing
statement and security agreement sufficiently described the
crops covered. The supplier also argued that it took title to
the grain free of the security interest as a buyer in the
normal course of business. The court held that the supplier
did not qualify as a buyer in the normal course of business
because the supplier did not give new consideration for the
grain but applied its price against an antecedent debt. Fifth
Third Bank v. Bentonville Farm Supply, 629 N.E.2d
1246 (Ind. Ct. App. 1994).
CITATION UPDATES
In re Flo-lizer, Inc., 164 B.R. 749 (S.D. Ohio 1994),
aff’g,  164 B.R. 79 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1993) (allocation of
plan payments of taxes) see p. 74 supra.
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